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Adaptive decision-making facilitates the consumption and distribu-
tion of resources in the quest for survival. Some decisions involve
choices between two options available immediately that differ in
aspects of value (e.g., relative preferences between attributes) or their
probability of occurrence (e.g., risk and uncertainty). However, an im-
portant class of decisions involves the comparison of options that differ
in the time they will be available, such as in choosing between smaller
rewards available immediately and larger rewards that can only be
obtained after some time. Choices that involve exchanges between
costs and benefits that occur at different points in time are defined as
intertemporal choices (ICs) (Johnson, 2012; Pimentel, Gonçalves,
Scholten, Carvalho, & Correia, 2012).
In this type of IC situations, decision makers must adjust the subjec-
tive value of the delayed reward to take into account the waiting time
until arrival. Delay discounting (DD) is the process of devaluing results
that happen in the future (e.g., Ainslie, 1974; Green & Myerson, 2004;
Logue, 1988; Rachlin & Green, 1972), as a means to study IC.2. Models of intertemporal choices and the Allais Paradox
There is extensive literature on how to model IC behavior. The
finding that most individuals willingly sacrifice the value to obtain the
reward in a shorter time interval was initially described by Samuelson
(1937) and is now replicated and expanded in many studies
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Kalenscher & Pennartz,
2008; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Pimentel et al., 2012). These
discounting effects are ubiquitous for both primary rewards (e.g., food,
juice; Ainslie, 1974; Kobayashi & Schultz, 2008; McClure, Ericson,
Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; Richards, Mitchell, Wit, &
Seiden, 1997) and secondary rewards (e.g., money; Loewenstein &
Prelec, 1992; Strotz, 1956; Tesch & Sanfey, 2008; Thaler, 1981). An
opposite phenomenon is often observed for repulsive stimuli, which
may become more negative if they are located further in time
(i.e., increasingly feared; Berns et al., 2006).2.1. Exponential model
In Samuelson's formula, DD was modeled as an exponential
decay function where subjective value (U) after a delay (D) is given by
U = Ae−βD, where A is the amount of reward and β is the discounting
rate.2.2. Hyperbolic model
Newer formulas have adopted alternative mathematical structures
to explain irregularities in IC behaviors. Individuals tend to show incon-
sistent preferences depending on the time until the rewards are avail-
able (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Thaler, 1981). For example, when
choosing between $100 now and $110 in two weeks, most individuals
prefer the smaller andmore immediate reward. However, when choos-
ing between $100 in 36 weeks and $110 in 38 weeks, almost everyone
chooses the larger reward — although the delay in this latter scenario
is identical to the previous one. This inconsistency, often called the im-
mediacy effect, implies that the mechanism used to compute the
intertemporal value shows a strong preference for immediate rewards,
but in larger temporal distances the discounting curve becomes
smoother (Pimentel et al., 2012). Alternative models that account for
these characteristics propose a hyperbolic (Kirby & Marakovic, 1995;
Laibson, 1997, 1998; Strotz, 1956) or a quasi-hyperbolic function
using two exponential decay functions (Loewenstein, 1996; Phelps &
Pollak, 1968; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).2.3. Allais Paradox
Although the models described above have proven to be useful,
when decisions are made in the face of uncertainty, human attitude to-
ward risk is not consistent (Iqbal, 2013). The classic model of decision
under risk is based on the theory of expected utility (Cohen, 2015;
von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), but the observed behavior of
decision-makers is often at odds with the expected utility model. This
can be exemplified with the effect that was coined as the Allais Paradox
(Allais, 1953).
The Allais Paradox is a well-known bias where the preferences of
individuals result in conflicting choices between two identical pairs of
options, butwithdifferent expected utility and value. Studies have dem-
onstrated that these reversals of preference depend on how the infor-
mation is presented and described (Harman & Gonzalez, 2015).
In the Allais Paradox, firstly, individuals are typically asked to
choose between options A and B and, afterwards, between options
C and D (Allais, 1953). For example, individuals have to start by
choosing between: (A) $1 million for sure or (B) a 10% chance of
receiving $5 million, 89% chance of receiving $1 million, and 1%
chance of receiving nothing. Then, individuals have to choose between:
(C) 11% chance of receiving $1 million or (D) 10% chance of receiving
$5 million.
The expected value of option A is $1 million and the expected value
of option B is $ 1.39million. According to the expected utility model, in-
dividuals are expected to choose the option with the highest expected
value, meaning the preference of B over A, and this entails the prefer-
ence of D over C (Da Silva, Baldo, & Matsushita, 2013). In turn, a prefer-
ence for A rather than B implies a preference for C instead of D.
Nevertheless, individual choices contrast with the predictions of the
theory (Koçaslan, 2014). Although showing a preference for D over C,
most people choose A in the first set of choices (thus the paradox),
and this tendency was labeled as “certainty effect” (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). Individuals prefer certain options when they are asked
to choose between a risky alternative and a certain one. In this scenario,
certainty contributes to risk aversion and their decisions become incon-
sistent between trials.
3. Neurobiological basis of intertemporal choices
It is known that dysfunctions in themechanisms of IC contribute to a
wide variety of anomalies related to decision-making, from inequities in
the distribution of resources (Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, &
Weinberg, 2001; Laibson, 1997), to pathologies in which decision-
making is altered, such as in addictions (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Perry
& Carroll, 2008), in attention deficit disorders (Critchfield & Kollins,
2001; Plichta et al., 2009), and in antisocial personality disorders
(Petry, 2002), among other conditions.
Through a systematic review, Monterosso and Luo (2010) postulate
that DD in humans is determined by the competition between two
evolutionary brain systems, a more primitive one that discounts delay
prematurely, and a more recent one that shows very little discounting.
The more recent system comprises sophisticated cognitive functions,
such as memory and self-signaling, leading to greater appreciation of
subsequent alternatives that are implicit in neocortical structures.
These capabilities do not affect choices through competition, but
through a process of mediation of primitive and central structures for
motivation and reward.
In adults, there are a number of functional neuroimaging studies that
shed light on the neural bases of IC. The neurobiological mechanism of
IC may be analyzed in two phases: evaluation and choice. As demon-
strated in a study by Liu, Feng, Wang, and Li (2012), distinct brain re-
gions seem to be involved in each phase. Specifically, the evaluation
phase was associated with the activation of the ventral striatum (VS)
and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). In turn, the processes
of choice were associated with the activation of the dorsolateral
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Luo's thesis (2010) regarding the involvement of a recent brain system
in discounting. Thus, the results suggest that dopaminergic mesolimbic
regions are sensitive to subjective value during the evaluation phase,
though absent in the choice phase.
Recent evolutionary brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), also seem to mediate the impact of priming cues
(e.g., brand logos) in the neural encoding of non-related, subjective val-
uation during temporal decision-making (Murawsk, Harris, Bode,
Domínguez, & Egan, 2012). In the study by Murawsk et al. (2012), the
preferences of the participants that relied on priming frequently tended
toward more immediate rewards during temporal discount tasks —
whichwas associatedwithmodulation of the neural encoding of subjec-
tive valuation of choice options in a brain network. It is possible to
assume, therefore, a general susceptibility of the decision-making sys-
tems to implicit contextual information, and that arbitrary symbols
(e.g., brand logos) can be represented as strong stimuli of rewards
that may affect decisions.
Even if much is now known on the neural bases of IC, the relation-
ship between discounting models and brain mechanisms remains to
be further analyzed.
Kable and Glimcher (2007) presented the hypothesis that the
neural systems for evaluation may reflect a singular function of hy-
perbolic discounting which functions independently from the delay
interval (Laibson, 1997; Mazur, 1987; Strotz, 1956). For each partic-
ipant, they measured the discounting preferences based on indepen-
dent behavioral sessions, and subsequently matched the results with
fMRI data. Kable and Glimcher (2007) concluded that the value of a
delayed result was represented in brain regions related to canonical
reward, whose activation was consistent with a model of hyperbolic
discounting (Glimcher, Kable, & Louie, 2007). Such finding provides
evidence that the delay evaluation shares neural mechanisms with
other types of evaluation, although important shortcomings can be
raised concerning this study and its results (cf. Berns, Laibson, &
Loewenstein, 2007; Glimcher et al., 2007). Moreover, different func-
tions do not seem to lead to significantly different results for varying
situations of IC, reflecting the general similarity between quasi-
hyperbolic and hyperbolic functions.
A possible strategy to disentangle the neural correlates of different
models would be to focus the tests on specific intervals of values
where higher discrepancies can be predicted. Also, the brain activations
that are observed may have upstream or downstream influences on a
subjective value representation. As summarized by Tesch and Sanfey
(2008), a variety of behavioral effects might modulate the subjective
value in IC.
These questions support a central topic for debate in neuroeconomic
research: the existence of a common “neural currency” for reward
(Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005; Montague & Berns, 2002; Montague &
King-Casas, 2007). At one extreme, evidence that IC shares evaluation
and decision mechanisms with other forms of choice (Benzion,
Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Green &Myerson, 1996) may support the con-
clusion that the subjective value is represented by a single neural cur-
rency. Therefore, temporal delay is one of the factors that contribute
to the representation of the value of a choice option, but said represen-
tation of value does not have special qualities due to temporal delay. At
the other extreme, evidence of fundamental differences between IC and
other types of choice may lead to the conclusion that IC reflects, at least
partially, the workings of a separate system for evaluation (Chapman &
Weber, 2006; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). Therefore, the subjective
value of a delayed result will only be compared with other value signals
at a final level before the output (e.g., response selection). The current
evidence from neuroimaging studies supports an intermediate perspec-
tive: that initial aspects of intertemporal evaluation reflect neuralmech-
anisms that differ from other forms of choice, but that associated value
signals are later represented in the context of a common reward system
(Carter, Meyer, & Huettel, 2010).4. Brain areas and circuits involved in IC
4.1. Structural neuroimaging
Research on IC using structural neuroimaging is scarce, but a study
by Bjork, Momenan, and Hommer (2009), related DD to proportional
frontocortical graymatter volumes from 29 healthy adults. Their results
demonstrated that dorsolateral and inferolateral frontal cortex gray
matter volumes each correlated inversely with preference for immedi-
ate gratification during decision making. A study where participants
completed a DD questionnaire assessing the extent to which they
preferred smaller, immediate rewards to larger, delayed rewards, after
undergoing fMRI, revealed a negative correlation between DD and
right prefrontal subgyral white matter volume, and a positive correla-
tion with white matter volume in parahippocampus/hippocampus
(Yu, 2012).
A more recent study by van den Bos, Rodriguez, Schweitzer, and
McClure (2014), using connectivity analyses in both structural and
fMRI, explored the relationship between distinct corticostriatal net-
works involved in IC. Their results showed distinct striatal pathways
that were differentially related to DD. Specifically, structural and func-
tional connectivity between striatum and lPFC was associated with in-
creased patience, while connectivity between subcortical areas and
striatum was related to increased impulsivity.
Finally, a study that was just published (Tschernegg et al., 2015) ex-
amined structural manifestations of trait impulsivity focusing on brain
regions associated with DD. Participants underwent fMRI, followed by
a DD task outside of the scanner. Results revealed positive correlations
between DD and gray matter volume in the striatum, and gray matter
volume of the caudate.
4.2. Functional neuroimaging
Evidence from functional neuroimaging is much more profuse, and
suggests the existence of a relationship between IC and both subcortical
and cortical areas of the reward system. Such studies generally report
the activation of the VS, including the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), the
mPFC, the dlPFC, as well as the activation of the posterior cingulate cor-
tex (PCC), duringDD (Ballard & Knutson, 2009; Kable &Glimcher, 2007;
McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). For example, Marco-
Pallarés, Mohammadi, Samii, and Münte (2010) conducted an fMRI ex-
periment where participants had to decide between a smaller and im-
mediate monetary reward vs. a larger and delayed reward. The results
showed two brain networks involved in the decision-making process
for immediate and delayed rewards. One network is involved when de-
cisions aremade for rewards and delays of equal subjective value, while
the other is involved in cases where the value of both the immediate re-
ward and the delay surpasses its alternative.While the posterior medial
frontal cortex (PMFC) was the only region that was active in decisions
nearing the point of indifference, the network activated by trials with
a clear preference for immediate or delayed rewards comprised the
vmPFC, ACC, insula, VS, parahippocampal gyrus (PHG), and amygdala.
Thus, DD tasks seem to activate a “default network” comprising the
frontal pole, the PCC, and also the parahippocampal gyri (Luhmann,
Chun, Yi, Lee, & Wang, 2008). This activation suggests that during IC,
decision makers simulate the impending delay through a process of
prospection (Luhmann et al., 2008).
In a similar approach, Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames, and Gilbert (2010),
in two studies using fMRI, demonstrated that individuals display less
activity in brain regions associated with introspective self-reference –
such as the vmPFC –when predicting howmuch theywould enjoy a fu-
ture event, thanwhen they predicted their enjoyment of present events.
In addition, the extent to which participants made shortsighted mone-
tary decisions several weeks later was predicted by the magnitude of
the vmPFC reduction. These findings suggest that shortsighted decisions
may result from an inability to imagine the subjective experience of
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from a subjective perspective. Hakimi and Hare (2015), using fMRI, ex-
amined whether the neural representation of an imagined primary re-
ward predicts the degree to which the value of delayed monetary
payments is discounted in a monetary IC task, and they found a correla-
tion between enhanced vmPFC activity during imagined reward and
reduced discounting.
Other prefrontal sectors also have important roles in IC. In fact, DD
relates to activity in the dlPFC and its connections with the vmPFC. In
a study by Hare, Hakimi, and Rangel (2014) it was explored how neural
activity relates to individual differences in the discounting of future re-
wards, during an intertemporalmonetary choice task. Their results sug-
gest a similar set of neurobiological mechanisms for tasks that involve
delayed gratification in dietary and monetary IC. These authors report
increased activity of the left dlPFCwhen subjects choose the delayed op-
tion, typically requiringmore self-control. They also found that the con-
nectivity from the left dlPFC to the vmPFC, which is widely associated
with the computation of stimulus values (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable,
2013), increased at the time of choice, particularly in trials where the
subjects opted for the delayed reward.
Activation in the posterior portion of the dorsomedial prefrontal cor-
tex (dmPFC) seems to bemodulated by the value of immediate options,
whereas activation in the adjacent anterior dmPFC may be modulated
by the subjective value of delayed options (Wang et al., 2014). However,
there was also a positive correlation between brain signal change in the
ventral mPFC and the “relative value”, in other words, the absolute dif-
ference of subjective value between two intertemporal alternatives.
Conversely, the activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex showed
a negative correlation with the relative value. These findings suggest
separate representations of immediate and delayed rewards in the dor-
sal mPFC, as well as their comparison in the ventral mPFC, to guide de-
cisions. Kable and Glimcher (2007) also found that the VS, the mPFC,
and the PCC track the revealed subjective value of delayed monetary
rewards.
The functional dissociation of the posterior and anterior dmPFC in
the representation of immediate and delayed rewards is congruent
with the general architecture of the prefrontal cortex, and may provide
a neural basis for the unique human capacities to delay gratification
(Wang et al., 2014). The increased activation of dmPFC during IC tasks,
together with the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and the posterior pari-
etal cortex, is being confirmed in recent studies (Rodriguez, Turner, Van
Zandt, & McClure, 2015).
One neuroimaging study by Ballard and Knutson (2009) has exam-
ined whether distinct neural substrates respond to the magnitude and
delay of future rewards. The authors found that activations in themedial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), together with NAcc and posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), positively correlated with future reward magnitude,
whereas dlPFC and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) activation negatively
correlated with future reward delay. Thus, these results suggest that
mesolimbic dopamine projection regions may have higher sensitivity
to the magnitude of future rewards, whereas lateral cortical regions
may be more sensitive to the delay of future rewards, possibly reconcil-
ing distinct neural accounts of DD. Results from a study by Xu, Liang,
Wang, Li, & Jiang (2009) regarding the neural mechanisms of DD in a
task with a symmetric pattern of gains and losses, also revealed the ac-
tivation of the lateral prefrontal and posterior parietal areas in the
discounting of both future gains and future losses, though their activa-
tionwas stronger when discounting losses. In fact, the insula, thalamus,
and dorsal striatum also evidenced higher activation during IC involving
losses, thus suggesting that the enhanced sensitivity to losses may be
driven by negative emotions. In addition, there was an activation of
the PCC andmPFCwhen the choices included immediate gains, whereas
extra regions including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and
superior frontal gyrus were preferentially activated when the choices
involved immediate losses. With respect to this, Tanaka, Yamada,
Yoneda, and Ohtake (2014) also found that when predicting futurelosses, there are significant differences in the striatal activity,
representing delay length, as well as in insular activity, which repre-
sents sensitivity to magnitude. Wittmann, Leland, and Paulus (2007)
have already suggested that the posterior insula, which is a critical com-
ponent of the decision-making neural network, is involved in DD.
It is known that the striatum and its interactions with other cortical
and subcortical networks are the basis of reward-based and goal-
oriented decisions. Neural activation to shorter delays compared to lon-
ger delays was associated with increased activation in the head of the
left caudate nucleus and putamen. A study by Wittmann et al. (2007)
found that when individuals chose the delayed reward instead of the
immediate reward, several brain areas, including the left caudate nucle-
us, displayed a correlation between discounting and brain activation for
the contrast of intervals with delays below 1 year and delays of 1 year or
more.
One study compared the behavioral and neural correlates of
intertemporal valuation of real and hypothetical monetary gains, as
well as hypothetical losses, having beenhypothesized that these involve
distinctmechanisms (Bickel, Pitcock, Yi, & Angtuaco, 2009). Participants
made IC decisions in a gains condition, using both real and hypothetical
$100money, as well as in a loss condition, using fictive $100money. Al-
though no differences were found between levels of discounting across
the three conditions, a first analysis of the fMRI data revealed a signifi-
cant signal change in limbic areas, namely the ACC, striatum, PCC, as
well as executive functioning areas, particularly the lPFC, but such ef-
fects did not survive after correcting for multiple comparisons. There-
fore the congruence of the BOLD signal between real and hypothetical
conditions in DD must be further explored.
In order to examine the role of sophisticated cognitive functions,
such as working memory (WM) processes in DD, Shamosh et al.
(2008) examined DD, intelligence, WM (span tasks, 3-back task), and
WM-related neural activity (using fMRI) in a sample of 103 healthy
adults. Their results suggested an association between DD and intelli-
gence, partly due to processes instantiated in the anterior prefrontal
cortex (aPFC). In addition, the tendency of more intelligent participants
to resist smaller, immediate rewardswas partially explained by individ-
ual differences in the left aPFC (Shamosh et al., 2008). Indeed, activity in
the left aPFC was positively associated with WM accuracy and intelli-
gence, and negatively associated with DD, across all subjects. These
findings are consistent with the role the prefrontal cortex in executive
functioning and its involvement in difficult decisions. In fact, when
responding to hard DD trials, participants evidence more activation in
areas related to executive functioning, such as the inferior frontal
gyrus and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, whereas activations of
the VS and inferior parietal lobule occur in response to both hard and
easy DD decisions (Avsar et al., 2013).
Regarding decisions under uncertainty, delaying the resolution of
uncertainty influencedmany of the subjects' preferences. It has been ar-
gued that choices are modulated by delays because decisionmakers ex-
perience positive or negative utility during the delay interval itself
(Luhmann et al., 2008). When outcomes are certain and the outcome
is negative, the utility associated with the delay period is referred to as
dread (Berns et al., 2006; Berns et al., 2007).
Summing-up, during the processing of gains and losses, there is ac-
tivation of a broad neural network, comprising the occipital, parietal,
and prefrontal cortex, thus suggesting that the same brain structures
support different economically relevant behaviors, regardless of the
outcome (Faralla et al., 2015). Moreover, two distinct neural circuits
were found to be involved in processing immediate and delayed mone-
tary outcomes. Whereas regions of the emotional system, namely, PCC
and mPFC, were engaged when an immediate (gain/loss) option was
chosen, the occipital cortex and the parietal cortex, in association with
the lateral and dlPFC, were activated in delayed choices.
In order to provide a coarse representation of the brain regions con-
sistently involved in DD studies, which seem to show substantial over-
lapping, Carter et al. (2010) performed an Activation Likelihood
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analysis of brain imaging studies (Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub, Eden,
Jones, & Zeffiro, 2002), with several advantages. On the one hand, it
identifies areas of activation convergence through several experiments
(Turkeltaub, Eickhoff, Laird, Fox, Wiener, & Fox, 2012; van Veluw &
Chance, 2014), thus allowing the identification of brain areas consis-
tently activated during different tasks that involve the same neurobio-
logical processes (Cromheeke & Mueller, 2014). On the other hand,
this identification provides the necessary empirical support between
the studies in favor or against the current theories on the phenomenon
to be studied (Gray, 2001; Pessoa, 2008). Wesley and Bickel (2014) also
performed an ALE analysis on foci from studies of DD (DD = 449),
working memory (WM = 452), finger tapping (FT = 450), and re-
sponse inhibition (RI = 450). They found that all tasks engaged the ac-
tivity of the ACC. In specific, FT strongly engaged motor-related brain
areas. In addition to motor-related areas, RI engaged frontal brain re-
gions. There was also activation of the right lPFC by RI, DD, and WM,
and it was contrasted out of overlapmaps. The unique overlap between
DDandWMwasmostly observed in a functional cluster in the posterior
portion of the left lPFC.
Each focus of activation is modeled as a three-dimensional Gaussian
probability distribution, where the standard deviation is determined by
group size instead of individual timepoints. The smaller the sample size,
the greater the uncertainty (Eickhoff et al., 2009). Activation probability
maps are created for each study/experiment, taking into account the
maximum probability of activation in each voxel (Belyk & Brown,
2014). These are random-effects analysis tests for the convergence of
activations between studies, against a null hypothesis of spatially inde-
pendent brain activations (Belyk & Brown, 2014).
During thefirst step, the probabilities of all the activation foci in an ex-
periment are aggregated for each voxel, which is depicted inmodeled ac-
tivation maps (fMRI) or modeled anatomical maps (VBM) (Raschle,
Menks, Fehlbaum, Tshomba, & Stadler, 2015). Then, all modeled maps
(fMRI and VBM separately) are combined on a voxel-by-voxel basis in
order to form an ALE image containing all unthresholded voxel ALE
values (Raschle et al., 2015). In the final step, this ALE image is tested
against the null hypothesis on the assumption that, regardless of the ex-
periments, all activated voxels are homogeneously distributed in the
brain (Raschle et al., 2015). Thus, the null hypothesis model, which is es-
sentially a distribution map created by several permutations of random
voxel activation, results from the use of a random-effects statisticalmeth-
od and is tested against the original ALE image according to the chosen
significance threshold (Raschle et al., 2015). Therefore, the construction
of the null distribution reflects a random special association between dif-
ferent studies. The comparison between the genuine ALE score and this
distribution allows for an inference on the convergence among studies,
at the same time that it preserves the relationship between individual
foci within each study (Raschle et al., 2015). This transition in inference,
from fixed or foci-based effects to testing between study effects, allows
for a generalization of the results to the entire population of studies
from which the analyzed studies were extracted (Raschle et al., 2015).
Carter et al. (2010) performed an ALE analysis of 378 foci in 13 stud-
ies using 10,000 permutations (10 mm FWHM), which yielded 25 sig-
nificant clusters, each representing regions that are more likely to be
activated during tasks involving DD. The regions included a network
of areas that are known to be sensitive to value, namely VS, mPFC,
orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior insula (Gottfried, O'Doherty, &
Dolan, 2003; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Montague &
Berns 2002; O'Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002) or subjec-
tive value, namely the PCC (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). A second region is
formed by a “nuclear network” of areas (Spreng,Mar., & Kim, 2009) that
support prospective processes such as autobiographical memory, theo-
ry of mind, and future planning, and include the inferior prefrontal cor-
tex, the mPFC, the temporo-parietal cortex, and the peri-splenial
posterior cingulate. Although the list of contrasts included in the ALE
analysis is diverse, these two networks were extracted confidently.4.3. EEG studies
The electrophysiological correlates of intertemporal decision-
making were examined in a study by Blackburn, Mason, Hoeksma,
Zandstra, and El-Deredy (2012). In this study, the N100/Early Posterior
Negativity and the Frontal Related Negativity emerged as event-related
potential (ERP) components of interest. Qu, Huang, Wang, and Huang
(2013) studied the Feedback Related Negativity (FRN) component of
the event related potentials in a simple game task to determine howde-
layed rewards and losses affect brain activity. The FRNwas elicitedmore
negatively only under the conditions of gain in which payment was de-
layed, as opposed to immediate gain. In this respect, it is possible that
DD and the signal effect may be encoded, at an initial evaluation
phase, in FRN. Furthermore, LORETA source localization for the FRN
component exhibited significantly higher brain electrical activity in
the left-fusiform gyrus and right superior temporal gyrus to monetary
loss, compared to monetary gain, after incorrect Go/No-Go responses
(De Pascalis Varriale, & D'Antuono, 2010).
In a study by Cherniawsky and Holroyd (2013), participants per-
formed a task in which they received both immediate and future re-
wards and non-rewards. They also completed a DD task without ERP
recording. The results showed that immediate, but not future rewards,
elicited the reward positivity. High discounters also displayed larger re-
ward positivities to immediate rewards, compared to low discounters,
indicating that high discounters relatively overvalued immediate re-
wards. These results may indicate that high discounters are more moti-
vated to work for monetary rewards than low discounters, regardless of
the time of arrival of the incentives.
5. Discussion
FMRI studies tend to report the activation of frontoparietal regions
(Kable & Glimcher, 2007), particularly, dmPFC (Rodriguez et al., 2015;
Wang et al., 2014), PPC (Ballard & Knutson, 2009; Tanaka et al., 2014;
Xu et al., 2009), and lPFC (Bickel et al., 2009), during DD tasks (Ballard
& Knutson, 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007;McClure et al., 2004). Studies
have also demonstrated that, during IC tasks, areas such as the dlPFC
(Faralla et al., 2015), ACC (Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010), VS (Kable &
Glimcher, 2007; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010), vmPFC (Hakimi & Hare,
2015; Liu & Feng, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2010), orbitofrontal cortex
(Tschernegg et al., 2015), bilateral posterior insular cortex (Wittmann
et al., 2007), and prefrontal subgyral (Yu, 2012) show strong activation.
DD is determined by the competition between two evolutionary
brain systems: (1) a more primitive one that discounts delay prema-
turely; and (2) a more recent one that shows very little discounting,
comprising sophisticated cognitive functions (e.g., memory and self-
signaling) (Monterosso & Luo, 2010). These capabilities do not affect
choices through competition, but through a process of mediation of
primitive and central structures for motivation and reward.
The neurobiological mechanism of IC may be analyzed in two
phases: evaluation and choice, which activate different neural areas
(Chapman &Weber, 2006; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). The evaluation
phase was associated with the activation of the VS and the vmPFC, and
the processes of choice were associated with the activation of the dlPFC
(Liu et al., 2012). Although, the more recent perspective is an interme-
diate perspective: initial aspects of intertemporal evaluation reflect
neural mechanisms that differ from other forms of choice, but associat-
ed value signals are later represented in the context of a common re-
ward system (Carter et al., 2010).
Different neural networks are enabled for immediate or delayed re-
wards and losses: PMFC was activated on decisions nearing the point of
indifference; vmPFC, ACC, insula, VS, PHG, amygdala (Marco-Palarrés
et al., 2010) and also PCC and mPFC were activated by immediate (Xu
et al., 2009) or delayed rewards (Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010). Activation
in dmPFC (Rodirguez et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2014) and lPFC
(Rodriguez et al., 2015) seems to be modulated by the value of
6 D. Moreira et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 26 (2016) 1–8immediate options. On the other hand, increased activity of the dlPFC is
found when subjects choose delayed rewards (Hare et al., 2014). VS,
mPFC, and PCC reveal subjective value of delayed monetary rewards
(Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Taken together, data suggests that distinct
neural substrates respond to magnitude and delay of future rewards.
Mesolimbic dopamine projection regions may have higher sensitivity
to the magnitude of future rewards (Ballard & Knutson, 2009). When
choices involved future losses, the most pronounced activity was ob-
served in the striatum (Tanaka et al., 2014), insula (Tanaka et al.,
2014; Xu et al., 2009), ACC, superior frontal gyrus (Xu et al., 2009),
left-fusiform gyrus, and right superior temporal gyrus (De Pascalis
et al., 2010). Regardless of whether choices involved immediate gains
or losses, PCC and mPFC were more activated (Faralla et al., 2015).
Concerning delayed choices, occipital cortex, parietal cortex, lateral
and dlPFC were activated (Faralla et al., 2015).
Findings also suggested that when subjects imagine the subjective
experience of their future self, vmPFC is involved in the simulation of fu-
ture events from a subjective perspective (Mitchell et al., 2010; Wang
et al., 2014). DD tasks seem to activate the frontal pole, PCC, and PHG
(Luhmann et al., 2008).
The brain regions that comprise the network of areas sensitive to
value include the VS, mPFC, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior insula
(Gottfried et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2001; Montague & Berns 2002;
O'Doherty et al., 2002). On the other hand, the “nuclear network”
(Spreng et al., 2009) is composed of regions that include the inferior
prefrontal cortex, the mPFC, the temporo-parietal cortex, and the peri-
splenial posterior cingulate, which also aid prospective processes, such
as autobiographical memory, theory of mind, and future planning. De-
spite the variety of methodologies discussed above and the diversity
of the list of contrasts included in the ALE analysis, these two networks
can be extracted with confidence.
Neural systems for evaluation may reflect a singular function of hy-
perbolic discounting (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). The value of a delayed
result was represented in brain regions related to canonical reward,
whose activationwas consistentwith amodel of hyperbolic discounting
(Glimcher et al., 2007; Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Different functions do
not seem to lead to significantly different results for varying situations
of IC, reflecting the general similarity between quasi-hyperbolic and hy-
perbolic functions.
The neuronal bases for delay and uncertainty are distinct. In many
cases, the preferences of the subjects were influenced by delaying the
resolution of uncertainty. Indeed, it has been suggested that delays
modulate choices, since decisionmakers experiencepositive or negative
utility during the delay interval itself (Luhmann et al., 2008). Regarding
outcomes that are certain and negative, the utility associated with the
delay period is referred to as dread (Berns et al., 2006; Berns et al.,
2007), which relates back to the Allais Paradox.
In conclusion, of all the evidence from neuroimaging and EEG stud-
ies, the thesis that choices are driven by a dual evaluation system is
corroborated.Funding
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